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Abstract 
We present a quantitative study of mental time travel to the past and future in sleep onset 
hypnagogia. Three independent, blind judges analysed a total of 150 mentation reports from 
different intervals prior to and after sleep onset. The linguistic tool for the mentation report 
analysis grounds on established grammatical and cognitive-semantic theories, and proof of 
concept has been provided in previous studies. The current results indicate that memory for the 
future, but not for the past, decreases in sleep onset – thereby supporting preliminary 
physiological evidence at the level of brain function. While recent memory research emphasizes 
similarities in the cognitive and physiological processes of mental time travel to the past and 
future, the current study explores a state of consciousness which may serve to dissociate between 
the two. 
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Introduction 
Sleep onset hypnagogia is the twilight state of human consciousness, marking the transition from 
waking to sleep. It occurs regularly and spontaneously in healthy humans, and allows researchers 
to study potential shifts in cognitive functions while waking consciousness fades into sleeping 
consciousness. Strategic awakenings performed several seconds to several minutes after sleep 
onset enable us to question participants on their hypnagogic mentation, mentation which would 
otherwise be forgotten over the course of the ensuing sleep cycles. In mapping cognitive functions 
on neurophysiological processes in sleep onset we may not only advance our understanding of 
human mentation, but in the long run also that of its clinical impairments and treatments. 
The transition to sleep is described as a continuous series of changes in (brain) physiology rather 
than an abrupt state change – it has therefore proven difficult to define one point in time at which 
sleep begins (Ogilvie, 2001). As a person falls asleep, slow electroencephalographic waves first 
occur locally towards the end of wakefulness. As a person transitions further into sleep, slow 
waves become global and merge into large, synchronized networks. As the level of cholinergic 
(arousalpromoting) neuromodulators decreases, cortical neurons enter an on-off mode of firing, 
first locally and then globally. These global on-off periods occur synchronously, producing a 
global low-frequency synchronisation of neuronal activity. Accordingly, during sleep onset, the 
variability of resting state networks decreases (Deco, Hagmann, Hudetz, & Tononi, 2014). 
It is assumed that in so far as episodic memories are conceived in sleeping or waking states of 
consciousness, they exhibit the same neurophysiological correlates (De Gennaro, Marzano, 
Cipolli, & Ferrara, 2012). It appears that the temporal-parietooccipital junction and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex play a crucial role in dream recall (which suggests that they were involved in 
encoding episodic memories generated during sleep), while hippocampal and amygdaloid 
structures mediate memories in both sleep and wakefulness (De Gennaro et al., 2012). In 
comparison to sleep offset mentation, sleep onset mentation has been described as less dreamlike 
with respect to bizarreness, emotion, and awareness about the current situation (Cicogna, Natale, 
Occhionero, & Bosinelli,1998). However, in previous studies, report judges could not detect 
differences between mentation reports from sleep onset and sleep offset with regard to 
references to memories (Cicogna et al., 1998). In how far hypnagogic imagery draws from 
memory input has previously been studied by systematic self-observation procedures in which 
the investigator observed and analysed his own hypnagogic imagery in spontaneous drowsy 
episodes during the day (Nielsen, 1995): According to this investigation, four types of memory 
sources (immediate-, short-, medium-, and long-term) appear to feed into hypnagogic imagery 
(Nielsen, 1995). Content of sleep onset mentation is believed to draw from episodic memory, as 
participants afterwards (once awake) tended to associate the content of sleep onset mentation 
with specific personal events (Cicogna, Cavallero, & Bosinelli, 1991; Cicogna et al., 1998). 
Mental time travel to the past (i.e. remembering past events) and to the future (i.e. imagining 
potential future events) seem to be two closely related processes (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2007): It is assumed that episodic memories of the past feed into memory for the future, and 
empirical evidence suggests that a future event can be imagined more vividly and in more detail 
if the imagination is anchored in an already familiar setting (de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 
2012; Schacter et al., 2007). 
A number of studies further indicate that imagining the future depends on much of the same 
neuronal structures that are needed for remembering the past, especially prefrontal and 
hippocampal regions, and that mental time travel in both directions is a function of default mode 
network (DMN) activity (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2006; Schacter et al., 2007). The 
physiological correlates of mental time travel to the past and future may be so closely related that 
it could prove difficult to determine differences between the two. However, there is indirect 
evidence which suggests that mental time travel to the past and mental time travel to the future 
are functions of distinct physiological processes: First, activity patterns within the DMN appear 
to differ depending on whether participants think about themselves in a present situation, or 
whether they imagine themselves in a future situation (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Second, the 
hippocampus shows greater activity when someone is remembering past episodes as opposed to 
imagining the future (Abraham, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2008; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 
2008; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010). Third, we could recently show (using the tool also applied 
in the present study) that DMN disintegration under LSD is connected with reduced mental time 
travel to the past, but not to the future (Speth, Speth et al., 2016). 
Mental time travels to the past and to the future evidently differ with respect to their temporal 
orientation. However, it has been suggested that the driving factor behind differences in 
remembering the past and imagining the future may not be the difference in temporal domain 
(past versus future) but a difference in the degree of imagination required (to picture fictional 
events versus those which have actually happened, and of which we have episodic past memories; 
Schacter et al., 2012). 
The DMN is a network of hub regions that show strong structural and functional connections 
which appear to play a role in various meta-cognitive processes (Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, 
Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010), including episodic memory retrieval and envisioning of the future, 
which form the two components of mental time travel (Addis & Schacter, 2008; Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Wagner, Shannon, 
Kahn, & Buckner, 2005). Mental time travel has been found to correlate positively with DMN 
resting-state functional connectivity (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010). 
The DMN has been shown to disintegrate (i.e. to exhibit decreased functional connectivity 
between its components) in sleep (Picchioni, Duyn, & Horovitz, 2013). While the connectivity 
between the DMN nodes is strongest in wakeful rest, connectivity has been reported to undergo 
only small changes (Horovitz et al., 2008; Larson-Priora et al., 2009), or no changes at all (Sämann 
et al., 2011), in sleep onset. In sleep stage 2, the functional connectivity between the posterior 
cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex is reduced, and decreases further in sleep stage 3 
(Sämann et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). This connectivity between posterior cingulate cortex and 
medial prefrontal cortex is thought to be connected to self-awareness (Vogt & Laureys, 2005). In 
REM sleep however, DMN connectivity increases again (Chow et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012). This 
increase in DMN connectivity during sleep could reflect the unique role which REM sleep plays 
for memory consolidation (e.g. Stickgold & Walker, 2007) and also with regard to dream 
generation (e.g. Hobson, 2009). 
The AIM model (Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000) offers a heuristic to predict changes in 
mental time travel to the future with regard to sleep onset. The model takes into account that 
non-REM and REM sleep show a decrease in frontal cerebral blood flow (Maquet et al., 1996, 
1997) and assumes a hypoactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as of the 
orbitofrontal cortex from waking en route to non-REM and REM sleep. The inactivation of frontal 
regions is considered to be a result of the interaction between two factors, namely state-
dependent brain activation patterns and chemical neuromodulation induced by the interaction 
of aminergic and cholinergic systems (Hobson et al., 2000). Fosse, Stickgold, and Hobson (2001) 
assume, based on findings from non-REM and REM sleep, that the ratio of aminergic/cholinergic 
neuromodulation, and consecutively frontal activation, decreases gradually from waking to sleep 
onset, and to non-REM and REM sleep. They speculate that in order to conceive and sustain 
thoughts, the brain relies on sufficient aminergic modulation to maintain dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortical activity. This process supports working memory while suppressing the perceptionof 
external stimuli. 
While this mechanism is strong in waking, it decreases together with aminergic modulation en 
route to REM sleep (Fosse et al., 2001). Correspondingly, ‘‘normal, wake-like thoughts” (Rowley, 
Stickgold, & Hobson, 1998: 67) have been shown to decrease – from waking, to sleep onset, to 
non-REM sleep, and REM sleep (Fosse et al., 2001), as well as during sleep onset – while the 
frequency of ‘‘unusual thoughts” and hallucinations increases (Rowley et al., 1998: 67). What 
further supports the prediction of the AIM model for sleep onset is that general blood-oxygen-
level dependent (BOLD) activity has been shown to decrease from waking to sleep onset – 
notably, amongst others, in the frontal lobes and limbic structures, including the hippocampus as 
well as the occipital lobes (Kaufmann et al., 2006). However, BOLD signal functional connectivity 
does not decrease within sleep onset, and functional connectivity within the dorsal attention 
network even increases slightly in light sleep (Larson-Priora et al., 2009). 
In summary, this study sets out to investigate mental time travel to the past and future during 
sleep onset hypnagogia. Mental time travel to the future is investigated as the ability to imagine, 
simulate, and predict possible future events (Ingvar, 1985; Schacter et al., 2007), while mental 
time travel to the past involves episodic memories of a particular autobiographical incident or a 
particular time and place (Tulving, 2002). Fosse, Fosse, Hobson, and Stickgold (2003) note the 
challenges of using first-person ratings on mental activity, and the participants’ differing 
understandings of episodic memories. Their observation resonates with the recent philosophical 
debate on the incommensurability of participants’ potentially biased explicit assessments of their 
own mental events versus their implicit knowledge of their own mental events as displayed in 
their mentation reports (Speth, Speth, & Harley, 2015; Windt, 2013). The current study therefore 
uses implicit, third person analyses of first person mentation reports, quantifying linguistic 
indications of memories for the future in reports from sleep onset hypnagogia. Quantitative 
linguistic analysis is conducted on mentation reports collected at different time intervals prior to 
and after sleep onset. Indications of memory for the future are quantitatively compared with 
indications of thoughts about episodic past memories. Linguistic indications of mental time travel 
to the past and to the future are distinguished from those of imaginations of present scenarios, 
which could with regard to further research be relevant for the differentiation between mental 
time travel and such imaginations that are not anchored in an episodic past scenario, or involve 
mental time travel to the future. 
Method 
This study investigates if reports from hypnagogia differ in the number of linguistic constructs 
that indicate memories for the future, as opposed to episodic past memories and thoughts about 
the present. Three independent judges (2 male, 1 female) were instructed to analyse a database 
of participants’ reports on mental activity during hypnagogia. The report raters were blind in so 
far as they were not informed from which stage of hypnagogia the individual reports had been 
collected. 
Database Description 
The reports stem from a large mentation report database, detailed information on which can be 
found elsewhere (Rowley et al., 1998; Stickgold, Malia, Fosse, & Hobson, 2001). In short, the 
database consisted of a total of 150 mentation reports from nightcap-monitored sleep onset. The 
reports were conceived while the participants (sixteen undergraduate students, 19 – 26 years of 
age, 8 male, 8 female) were still awake, or either 15 s, 45 s, 75 s, 120 s, or 300 s after sleep onset. 
The nightcap allows home setting recordings without an investigator. It detects head and eyelid 
movements as indicators of sleep onset. Head movement is measured using a mercury switch 
while eyelid movement is measured with a piezoelectric eyelid sensor. Sleep onset is identified in 
terms of a 15 s interval with no more than one eyelid movement (Stickgold, Pace-Schott, & 
Hobson, 1994). A computer attached to the nightcap awoke participants multiple times per night 
at the different points in time after sleep onset. Participants taped their oral reports themselves. 
Quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation reports 
Specific linguistic references to memory for the future, episodic past memory, and thoughts about 
the present were quantified in the participants’ mentation reports. For detailed explanations of 
the linguistic tool please see below, and also compare Fig. 1. In brief, the linguistic tool developed 
for the quantitative analysis is partly grammatical and partly cognitivesemantic. The grammatical 
part of the tool is based on linguistic theta theory (Gruber, 2001; Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & 
Siloni, 2005) and measures linguistic references to cognitive agency, i.e. grammatical agencies 
connected to the semantic field of cognition, describing cognitive acts such as thinking, 
remembering, or planning. It has been used in different versions to successfully link degrees of 
linguistic references to motor imagery in mentation reports with motor cortical activation of the 
respective state of consciousness (Speth, Frenzel, & Voss, 2013), to investigate the effect of 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on motor imagery (Speth et al., 2015; Speth & 
Speth, 2016a), and to measure the number of linguistic indications of auditory verbal 
hallucinations and inner speech in different states of consciousness (Speth, Harley, & Speth, 
2016), as well as to investigate memory for the future across states of consciousness (Speth, 
Schloerscheidt, & Speth, submitted for publication). The second part of the current tool is based 
on the cognitive-semantic theory of mental spaces by Fauconnier and Turner (Fauconnier, 1994; 
Fauconnier & Turner, 1997): The method of analysing future, past, and present mental spaces 
was developed for this study in order to measure if instances of cognitive agency introduced 
references to future, past, or present scenarios that were imagined or recalled by the participants 
relative to the mentation time. 
 Figure 1: All individual phrases of the mentation reports were analysed with regard to cognitive agencies introducing 
mental spaces for the past, present, or future.   
Analysis of mental spaces hosting past, present, or future scenarios  
In linguistic theta system theory, the initiator of an event takes on a specific thematic (theta) role 
within a sentence or phrase. He or she is the agent who performs an action. In the phrase “Mimi 
throws a ball”, Mimi is the agent. The agent is defined through his or her relationship to the 
predicate of a phrase: He or she is performing the action described by the predicate. Mimi is the 
one who is doing something. The agent is described by a noun phrase, but the agent does not 
necessarily correlate with the grammatical subject. Consider the following examples, where Mimi 
is the agent in both (i) and (ii), but the syntactic subject only in the active version (i). 
(i) Mimi opens the box. 
(ii) The box is opened by Mimi. 
The current tool focusses on cognitive agency, i. e. on grammatical agencies connected to the 
semantic field of cognition, describing cognitive acts such as thinking, remembering, or planning. 
The following phrases (iii) to (ix) contain examples of cognitive agency as they occur in mentation 
reports:  
(iii) I was thinking, you know, just thinking about things.  
(iv) I just realized that I missed my Italian class yesterday.  
(v) Trying to figure out what went wrong during my date the other day. 
(vi) Just relaxing, contemplating if I… should I be helping Anna and Jill with the dishes 
or be at the gym instead of sitting around. 
(vii) Thinking about the people in Africa, and what they must feel like fearing that 
Ebola virus. 
(viii) Asking myself if Mimi is going to enjoy the party.    
(ix) Wondering if I can ace the exam tomorrow.  
Often cognitive agents build what linguists call mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier & 
Turner, 1997). The notion of mental spaces is borrowed from the philosophical concept of 
possible worlds – although mental spaces are understood as essentially cognitive scenarios that 
are not necessarily attributed a specific metaphysical value, and nor do they have to be logically 
consistent. Mental spaces can host past, present, and future scenarios. Examples (iv) and (v) 
present cognitive agencies building a mental space for the past. The cognitive agencies in (vi) and 
(vii) each host a present mental space, and the cognitive agencies in (viii) and (ix) host mental 
spaces for the future. Mental spaces are marked via (a) grammatical clues (“going to enjoy the 
party”), (b) immediate semantic clues (“yesterday”, “the other day”, “tomorrow”), or (c) 
contextual clues (someone is “sitting around” pondering if he or she should rather be active in 
terms of “helping Anna and Jill” or by being “at the gym” – or someone is picturing the current 
situation in Africa, contemplating what it must be like for the Africans). In this study, a space built 
by the cognitive agent is defined as a future, past, or present scenario in relation to the cognitive 
action carried out during the mentation period on which the participant is reporting.  
 
Report rating instructions 
All raters were asked to judge all reports. Raters were given a hard copy of the reports and an 
instruction manual that explained how to identify instances of cognitive agency and ensuing 
mental spaces in the reports. The instruction manual contained the brief definitions of cognitive 
agency and mental spaces given above. Raters were asked to count first person cognitive agencies 
connected to future, past, or present mental spaces in relation to the cognitive act itself. Raters 
were informed that the mentation reports were transcribed in a way that the original, natural 
speech is preserved. They would therefore encounter elliptical, aborted, and grammatically ill-
formed sentences, and there would be cases where they would be unsure about their rating 
decisions. Raters were asked to use their best judgment and decide how to deal with such 
particular phrases, as not all varieties of cognitive agency and ensuing mental spaces possible in 
natural speech can be pre-defined.  
Statistical analyses 
The number of identified instances of mental spaces hosting past, present, and future scenarios 
was counted for every report, separately for every rater. By calculating the mean rating of all 
raters for each report, one rating value for past, for present, and for future scenarios was assigned 
to each report. 
One-way analyses of variances (ANOVAs) were conducted to test if the number of past, present, 
or future scenarios differ between the times of awakening. Effect size was estimated by η². 
Pairwise Scheffé testing was used post hoc. To ensure that the effects are not a result of mere 
differences in report length, analyses of covariances (ANCOVAs) with word count as a covariate 
were conducted. Here, effect size was estimated by partial η². Fisher's least significant difference 
(LSD) test was used post hoc.   
 
Results 
The 150 reports from sleep onset comprised 35 reports conceived while the participant was still 
awake, prior to sleep onset. A total of 27 reports were conceived 15 s after sleep onset, 20 reports 
after 45 s, 26 reports after 75 s, 18 reports after 120 s, and 24 reports 300 s after sleep onset. 
Linguistic samples from reports conceived at the different points in time can be seen in Table 
1. Rater 1 identified an average of 1.45 (SD =1.52), Rater 2 an average of 1.45 (SD = 1.55), and 
Rater 3 an average of 0.97 (SD = 1) cognitive agencies per report. On average, the three raters 
identified 1.3 (SD = 1.21) cognitive agencies per report. Cronbach’s α for the agreement on the 
number of cognitive agencies per report was .87. 
The number of references to future events changed significantly between the different times of 
forced awakening (F (5, 144) = 4.70, p < .001, η² = .14). Post-hoc pairwise testing indicated that 
reports conceived while the participant was still awake (M = 0.94, SD = 1.42) did not differ 
significantly from reports collected 15 s (M = 0.32, SD = 0.49, p = .110), and 45 s (M = 0.33 
SD = 0.75, p = .203) after sleep onset, but differed significantly from reports collected 75 s 
(M = 0.18, SD = 0.37, p = .023), 120 s (M = 0.13, SD = 0.35, p = .037), ank2d 300 s (M = 0.11, 
SD = 0.85, p = .012) after sleep onset. 
No significant change was observed in the number of cognitive agencies introducing present 
events (F (5, 144) = 0.44, p = .818). Further, there were no significant differences in the number 
of cognitive agencies introducing mental spaces for the past between the different times after 
sleep onset (F (5, 144) = 1, p = .423).  
 Figure 2: Number of mental spaces for present, future, and past events per report at different times after sleep onset. Error 
bars show the standard error of the mean; some error bars are omitted for clarity. 
After correcting for report length (word count of the report), the number of cognitive agencies 
introducing mental spaces for the future still differed significantly over the course of sleep onset 
(F(5, 143), p = .016, partial η² = .107). There were more cognitive agencies introducing mental 
spaces for the future in reports conceived after the participant had still been awake than 15 s 
(p = .007), 45 s (p = .014), 75 s (p = .001), 120 s (p = .006), and 300 s (p = .003) after sleep onset. 
Table 1: Linguistic samples from reports conceived from sleep onset while participants were still awake, and after 15 s, 
45 s, 75 s, 120 s, and 300 s after sleep onset. Linguistic references to mental spaces for the present, future, and past 
introduced by the cognitive agencies are given.  
 Sample Memory  
waking (prior 
to sleep onset 
hypnagogia) 
 
 
 
 
I was thinking about when I’m going to make my last day and if 
I have to actually be in the office on the last day and imagining 
what personnel was going to say […] And I think I got to get my 
wisdom teeth out and I got to make sure I don’t leave until April 
so I can have my insurance through the end of the month.  
4 mental spaces  for the future 
15 s  I think I was thinking of sidewalks, maybe some lamps on it. It 
was just a blur. I don’t know.  
 
I was thinking about cooking some kind of food and how good it 
tastes and it was some kind of appetizer dish.  
 
1 mental space for the present 
 
 
1 mental space for the present 
 
 
And I was thinking about like the two of us back in high school 
and stuff, how we interacted and everything in like a rock band 
that I was in.   
 
 
1 mental space for the past 
45 s  I’m thinking about the formal tomorrow night and that I; 
whether I’m gonna look like a giant next to F. and he’s gonna look 
small next to me… 
 
1 mental space for the future 
 
 
75 s Thinking that I look pretty good standing on an escalator; riding 
up an escalator.  
 
I was thinking about an old friend of mine who I haven’t seen in 
a while… who… and I guess I was seeing us in our past 
interactions acting together and just hanging out. 
 
1 mental space for the present 
 
 
1 mental space for the past 
120 s 
 
Playing tennis. And it was sunny and warm and we were in 
Florida ‘cause I think we were… golf course… courses… and my 
Dad was there; I’m not sure if I can remember anything else 
except that I couldn’t play golf at all. 
 
I think I was thinking about a hotel. I can’t make sen-; I don’t 
really know; some hotel thing.  
 
And I just want to go to sleep and I was wondering when this 
onset part ends. 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
1 mental space for the present 
 
 
1 mental space for the future 
300 s 
 
 
 
 
I was wandering on some kind of hill that was near a port and 
two minutes or so before I saw like a white light.  
 
I was picturing I think a big gorge, in an African Savannah maybe, 
Oldiva gorge […] thinking about, you know, elements of an 
archaeological dig and the sort of thing and you know… 
 
I was thinking about something about people again, but I think 
like people walking around the room. 
 
Things are blurry now and it probably involved being in my own 
house, my dorm, and having people around. 
 
Just then I was doing like I was on a beach somewhere exotic so, 
stretched out on the sand, it was very comfortable.  
N/A  
 
 
2 mental spaces for the present 
 
 
 
1 mental space for the present 
 
 
N/A  
 
 
N/A 
 
Discussion 
This study set out to investigate mental time travel to past and future in sleep onset hypnagogia 
– aiming to understand possible shifts in the human ability to remember past events and imagine, 
simulate, and predict possible future events as waking consciousness fades into sleeping 
consciousness. Third person analysis of first person mentation reports from different intervals of 
sleep onset was used to measure memories for the future, and to quantitativelk2y compare them 
to episodic past memories as well as thoughts about possible present scenarios. The present 
study indicates that the current tool objectively and reliably detects linguistic indications of 
future, past, and present mental spaces as expressed in the language of mentation reports. It is 
noted that strictly speaking, the tool measures memories of memories of the future and past, as 
well as of thoughts about the present, as they occur in offline mentation reports delivered only 
after the mentation experience itself – a methodological necessity in empirical dream research 
(Wamsley, 2013; Windt, 2013). An advantage of the quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation 
reports is that it presents a conservative measure in so far as it looks for differences in the mental 
events as they are expressed as pre-defined linguistic differences in the reports from different 
experimental conditions (Speth et al., 2013). The high agreement achieved by the report raters in 
the current study as well as in related studies (Speth, Speth et al., 2016; Speth, Harley et al., 2016; 
Speth & Speth, 2016b; Speth et al., 2013, 2015; Speth & Speth, in press), despite the fact that they 
did not receive intense training or possess a psycholinguistic background, suggests. 
The nightcap has been shown to be a reliable tool to investigate sleep onset (Cantero, Atienza, 
Stickgold, & Hobson, 2002). It is especially useful for large-scale investigations in home settings. 
However, sleep onset latency determined by the nightcaphas been shown to differ by 45 s from 
sleep onset latency determined by polysomonography in a laboratory setting (Cantero et al., 
2002). This should be kept in mind when comparing the present home-based results with 
potential future results obtained in laboratory settings.  
With regard to further improving the method of quantitative linguistic analysis, it might be 
worthwhile to control notonly for the length of the reports (using word count), but to also control 
for the number of ‘‘temporal units” (Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983) in the mentation reports. These 
temporal units are established by using activity described in the mentation reports, and assigning 
temporal units to these described activities. However, it would be difficult to use this as an 
extension of the current tool: In order to determine the temporal unit of a given report, we would 
first need the participants themselves, and afterwards independent raters to rate the occurrence 
and then the sequence of temporal units within the mentation reports. The advantage of using 
this approach could be that this might avoid some uncertainty of other dream studies as to 
whether the quantity of the content, or the number of words needed to describe given content, is 
the driving factor for length differences between reports from different sleep states. The 
downside of using this combined approach can be that the current quantitative method of 
linguistic analysis was designed as a formal and objective form of analysis with the aim of keeping 
the raters’ room for interpretation, and their cognitive load, to a minimum – and further as a form 
of analysis that does not require input from participants in addition to the original report they 
are asked to deliver. These aims could become compromised if temporal unit scoring is used. 
 Even though the reports from later points during hypnagogia potentially cover a longer 
mentation span, they were found to exhibit fewer mental spaces for the future (note that results 
were robust to correction for report length). As these results point towards a gradual decline in 
memory for the future within sleep onset, they can be seen as supporting previous assumptions 
made based on the AIM model (Hobson et al., 2000) that assume a gradual decrease of 
physiological activity, namely prefrontal activity, from waking to sleep onset, en route to REM 
sleep (Fosse et al., 2001). The present results further fit in with physiological evidence on the 
decrease in frontal and limbic lobe metabolism during sleep onset (Kaufmann et al., 2006), which 
are brain regions considered fundamental to memory for the future (Flinn, Geary, & Ward, 2005; 
Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). In the light of (i) previous studies which 
indicate that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex play a fundamental 
role for memory for the future (Flinn et al., 2005; Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007) as well as (ii) predictions based on the AIM model that these areas gradually decrease in 
sleep onset, the present findings appear to provide first evidence that memory for the future 
decreases during sleep onset hypnagogia. Even though memory for the future is believed to rely 
on much of the same neuronal structures that are needed for remembering the past, especially 
prefrontal and hippocampal regions (Hassabis et al., 2006; Schacter et al., 2007), the current 
results suggest that the number of linguistic indications of episodic past memories, along with 
thoughts about present scenarios, remains fairly constant throughout sleep onset hypnagogia. As 
explained in the following, there may be two possible explanations for this observation. 
First, it should be noted that episodic past memories were rare to begin with in pre-sleep waking, 
which may have produced a floor effect – and indeed memory for the future has been shown to 
be the more salient component of the cognitive function that is mental time travel (Suddendorf, 
Addis, & Corballis, 2009; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005). Insofar as memories for the future can be 
considered a crucial part of waking thought, the present results further tie in with earlier findings 
that ‘‘normal, wake-like thoughts” decrease from waking to sleep onset to non-REM sleep to REM 
sleep, as well as during sleep onset – while the frequency of ‘‘unusual thoughts” and hallucinations 
increases (Fosse et al., 2001; Rowley et al., 1998). The present results suggest that this previously 
observed decline in ‘‘normal, wake-like thoughts” (Rowley et al., 1998: 67) at sleep onset may be 
closely tied up with the decline of memory for the future, while the number of thoughts connected 
with past events is relatively low to begin with. This relatively low number of episodic past 
memories is consistent with previous findings that identify different fragments of recent waking 
episodes, but rarely find more elaborate replications of waking events in mentation reports from 
sleep (Fosse et al., 2003; Wamsley, Perry, Djonlagic, Reaven, & Stickgold, 2010; Wamsley & 
Stickgold, 2011). 
A second possible explanation to what appears to be a decline specifically in memories for the 
future is that at this point in time, phenomenological insight may exceed physiological knowledge 
with regard to memory capacities in spontaneous brain activity, and especially spontaneous brain 
activity at sleep onset. In so far as our preliminary results indicate differences in the shift of 
memory for the future, in comparison to episodic past memory, during sleep onset hypnagogia, 
they should be considered in conjunction with emerging differences for these memory structures 
in waking (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter et al., 2012).  
The current study attempted to differentiate between mental time travel to the past and mental 
time travel to the future, as well as thoughts about the present. This helps to confirm that the 
observed changes in memory for the future during sleep onset appear to be driven by a shift in 
the temporal domain in which thoughts are anchored (i.e. past scenarios or potential future 
scenarios), as opposed to a decrease in the imagination required: Insofar as thoughts about a 
possible present situation, and thoughts about potential future situations, do not draw from 
episodic past memories (of actual events), they should require more imagination (to conceive 
fictional scenarios). Importantly, the current study saw only a decrease in thoughts about 
potential future scenarios, while the number of references to thoughts about the present, and 
about past episodes, remained roughly the same. This is in line with recent research on memory 
for the future, which demands that studies should seek to differentiate between two possibly 
unrelated factors: (i) temporal domains (i.e. whether a thought is anchored in the past versus in 
the hypothetical future), and (ii) mentation revolving around actual versus fictional events 
(Schacter et al., 2012). 
The present study tentatively indicates that sleep onset correlates with a decrease specifically in 
mental time travel to the future. If the observed decrease in mental time travel to the future were 
driven by a decrease in imagination (i.e. a decrease in thoughts revolving around fictional versus 
scenarios actually experienced), we should have seen a decrease not only in mental time travel to 
the future, but also in thoughts about the present. This study however saw a decrease only in 
imaginations of the future during sleep onset, while no change was observed in references to 
mental time travel to the past and thoughts about possible present scenarios (Table 2). In 
conclusion, this may provide first evidence that the decrease in mental time travel to the future 
is driven by a decrease in temporal mentation, not by a reduced tendency to imagine (atemporal) 
fictional events. The quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation reports allowed us to test these 
difficult latent variables in an indirect way, harnessing participants’ implicit knowledge of their 
mental events as opposed to relying on their differing understanding of the present variables 
(Fosse et al., 2003). 
Table 2: The current results indicate a decrease in mental time travel to the future, but not to the past, during sleep onset. 
This decrease in mental time travel to the future seems to be driven by a decrease in temporal mentation, as opposed to a 
reduced tendency to imagine fictional (atemporal) events: While both mental time travel to the future, and thoughts about 
the possible present scenarios, require imaginations of fictional events (as opposed to mental time travel to the past, which 
draws from episodic past memories of events that have actually been experienced), a decrease was observed only for 
mental time travel to the future.  
K2 Temporal 
domain 
Imagination required Change during the state of 
sleep onset 
Mental time travel 
to the past 
Past Low (thoughts about 
actual past events) 
No change 
Thoughts about 
possible present 
scenarios 
Present High (thoughts about 
imaginary present events) 
No change 
Mental time travel 
to the future 
Future High (thoughts about 
imaginary future events) 
Decrease  
 
Insights about regularly occurring hallucinatory states could, in the long run, lead to an improved 
understanding and treatment of clinical conditions that have been associated with hallucinations 
as pathological symptoms. The tool presented in the current study allows us to quantify mental 
time travel during spontaneous mentation. It thus lets us establish changes in the capacity for 
mental time travel in different states of consciousness as a function of neurophysiological 
changes. While clearly much further research is necessary, the current tool may therefore be used 
in future studies to shed more light on the neurophysiological mechanisms of mental time travel, 
and the conditions for its reduction in connection with memory impairments. The tool could also 
be used to learn more about psychological disorders which are characterized by an unusual 
amount of mental time travel to the future, such as generalized anxiety disorder, which can 
involve anxious apprehension: Patients may engage in a lot of forward thinking in the form of 
worrying about possible future happenings, and often also show symptoms of depression 
(Gladstone & Parker, 2003; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Miranda & Mennin, 2007; Wells & Carter, 
2001). As the current tool is also designed to quantify mental time travel to the past, it could 
similarly be used to further explore conditions of depression, for which in addition to worrying 
about future events, a high level of rumination about past events is typical (Berman et al., 2011; 
MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007), or posttraumatic stress 
disorder, which is characterized by sudden flashbacks to past episodes both in waking and in 
sleep (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Lawrence-Wood, VanHoof, Baur, & McFarlane, 2015). 
Along these lines, to measure potential treatment success, the present tool was recently used to 
show that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) intake decreases mental time travel to the past in 
healthy participants (Speth, Speth et al., 2016) and thus provides first evidence that LSD could be 
reintroduced into psychotherapy, specifically to treat patients who report excessive rumination. 
 The advantage of the current tool, in comparison to questionnaires, task paradigms, and other 
forms of assessments such as patients’ descriptions of symptoms in therapeutic settings, is its 
objectivity and potentially enhanced ecological validity. It lets us quantify mental time travel, to 
the past or future, as it occurs in phases of spontaneous brain activity during default mode waking 
and sleep stages across the normal circadian cycle.  
By determining the neuronal and cognitive shifts that occur as we fall asleep, we could 
increasingly learn to dissociate between the components that constitute waking consciousness – 
such as reflection, anticipation, and planning. Although of course much future research is 
necessary, this could lead to a better understanding of pathological alterations of these structures 
in waking, which may ultimately allow for improved clinical treatment. 
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